The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship
& the Law
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 1

11-20-2007

The "Evolving Written Description Doctrine" and the Search for
Specificity (A.K.A. Adequacy is the Matter of Invention.)
Gerald R. Prettyman Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerald R. Prettyman Jr., The "Evolving Written Description Doctrine" and the Search for Specificity (A.K.A.
Adequacy is the Matter of Invention.), 1 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. Iss. 1 (2007)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol1/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

THE “EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
DOCTRINE” AND THE SEARCH FOR
SPECIFICITY (A.K.A. ADEQUACY IS THE
MATTER OF INVENTION.)
GERALD R. PRETTYMAN, JR.
I.Abstract................................................................................................................... 2
II.Introduction and Background ................................................................................ 4
A. Introduction and Role of the Written Description ................................ 4
1. The Statutory Basis for a Written Description ............................... 4
2. Describing the Invention ................................................................ 4
3. Preventing “New Matter” From Being Claimed ............................ 5
B. Introduction to the Claim ..................................................................... 6
1. A Brief History of Claims .............................................................. 6
2. Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law........................ 7
3. The Fine Art of Claim Construction .............................................. 7
4. Role of the Specification to Claim Construction ........................... 8
C. Patent Claims at Modern Law .............................................................. 8
1. Enablement .................................................................................... 8
a. The Statutory Role .................................................................. 8
b. The Judicial Role .................................................................... 9
2. Definiteness ................................................................................... 9
3. Best Mode .................................................................................... 10
4. The Judicial Doctrine of Possession ............................................ 11
a. Supporting the Written Description ...................................... 11
b. The Filing Date ..................................................................... 11
c. Scope of Enablement ............................................................ 12
d. Predictability of the Art ........................................................ 13
III.The Background Cases....................................................................................... 15
A. Introduction to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine ............... 15
B. JVW and the Imported Function Doctrine ......................................... 16
1. The Patent at Issue: U.S. 4,494,754 ............................................. 16
2. Claim Construction and the District Court Ruling ....................... 16
a. Claim Construction ............................................................... 16
b. Holding by the District Court ............................................... 17
3. Errors by the District Court.......................................................... 17

Registered Patent Attorney. LL.M. (Intellectual Property), J.D., Golden Gate University; B.S.M.E.,
University of California, San Diego. Contact information is available on the Patent and Trademark
Office Attorney list. The author extends his sincere appreciation to his mentors, Professors Marc
Greenberg and Virginia Meyer.

2

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. I:1

4. Infringement Analysis.................................................................. 18
5. Discussion and Summary on JVW .............................................. 19
C. LizardTech And The Possession Test ................................................ 21
1. The Patent At Issue: U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835 .......................... 21
2. Claim Construction Issues ........................................................... 21
3. Invalidation for Lacking Possession ............................................ 22
4. Per Curiam Denial of Rehearing .................................................. 25
5. Concurring Opinion and Counterarguments ................................ 25
a. Does Judicial Doctrine Rule Over the Statute? ..................... 25
b. Applying Quid Pro Quo to the Written Description ............. 26
c. Patent Practice ...................................................................... 29
d. Inconsistencies ...................................................................... 30
e. Passing the Opportunity ........................................................ 30
f. Elucidated Embodiment Test ................................................ 31
g. No New Matter ..................................................................... 32
h. A Non-Action is Not Precedent ............................................ 33
IV.Rise of the Evolving Written Description Doctrine ........................................... 33
A. Circuit Judge Rader Dissents ............................................................. 33
1. Circuit Judge Rader’s View on the JVW Opinion ....................... 33
2. Comparing the Opinions .............................................................. 34
B. The Crooked Path to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine ...... 35
C. The Link to Possession....................................................................... 36
D. An Evolving Mystical Expression...................................................... 37
E. Mystical Precedent .............................................................................. 38
V.Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 40
A. From the Judicial Point of View: Show Possession ............................ 40
B. From the Statutory Point of View: Enablement and Definiteness....... 40
C. From the Practitioner Point of View ................................................... 41
I.

ABSTRACT

In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Markman that claim construction
was a matter of law for the judge to decide.1 There was hope in the patent bar that
Markman would bring uniformity to claim construction and a reduction to the
lengthy process of patent litigation.2 Some authors report instead that the claim
construction reversal rate is increasing.3 Other authors question the consistency of

1

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
Id. at 390.
3
For example, reversal rates from 1983 to 2000 averaged 22%. Professor Moore's "detailed study
of patent cases … found that … the CAFC reversed 22% in some form." Andrew T. Zidel, Patent
Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need For Clear Guidance from the
Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 739 (2003) (citing (then Professor, now Circuit Judge)
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - an Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99
MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (2000)). Then, from 1996 to 2003, reversal rates averaged 34.5%. ("The
reversal rate … from 1996 … through 2003 is 34.5%." Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005)). For
2001, reversal rates averaged 41.5%. (In 2001, "41.5%, of the cases having Markman Hearings had
their claim construction reversed on appeal." Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial
2
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the rulings from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 Circuit Judge Rader
of the Federal Circuit recently named this controversy the “Evolving Written
Description Doctrine.”5
Behind this controversy primarily lies judicial interpretation of the patent
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 112, with other statutes invoked periodically to support or
counter differing opinions.6 These opinions suggest that the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is invoking the judicial doctrine of possession to modify what
the statutory requirements of enablement, best mode and definiteness.7 A patentee
writing a broad embodiment may suffer invalidity for failing to satisfy the
definiteness requirement. Conversely, an application with distinctly expressed
embodiments may suffer from element exclusion and forfeit an otherwise
acceptably broad embodiment.8
This article reviews the back-to-back cases of JVW Enterprises, Inc. v.
Interact Accessories, Inc.,9 and LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.10
The subsequent en banc denial in LizardTech evoked a declaration by Circuit
Judge Rader that the Federal Circuit has created an “Evolving Written Description
Doctrine,” in part over the court’s invocation of the possession test.11 Together
with a discussion of the patent law and the judicial doctrines behind it, this article
seeks to show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is misapplying
judicial doctrine (notably, the possession test) and lowering the standard for when
this judicial doctrine applies.
Section I provides an overview of patent law and judicial doctrines that are

Courts: A Study Showing the Need For Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 711, 741 (2003)). Irrespective of minor statistical differences, these articles state that judges
facing claim construction rulings in patent cases have a chance of being overturned ranging from onequarter to almost half. Thus, patent judges face a reversal rate several times higher than other areas of
law. (The reversal rate in all circuits for all appeals (criminal and civil) from April 1, 2002 to March 31,
2003 was 9.4%. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistic, Table B-5, Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by
Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2003, available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/
caseload2003/tables/B05Mar03.pdf (last visited October 14, 2007). However, different authors count
reversal statistics somewhat differently. Some authors do not count a reversal if the reversal was based
on Rule 36. "All of the other early claim construction studies (the Chu Study (44% reversal rate), the
Bender Study (40% reversal rate), and the Zidel Study (41.5% reversal rate)) omitted Rule 36 cases
from their claim construction reversal rate determinations." Kimberly A. Moore, "Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?" 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 235-236 (2005)
(citations omitted)).
4
Michael A. O'Shea, A Changing Role For The Markman Hearing: In Light Of Festo Ix, Markman
Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which Are Longer, More Complex And Ripe For Appeal, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 843, 2004.
5
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1381, (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Circuit
Judge Rader dissenting).
6
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) et. seq.
7
An early invocation of possession as relating to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) was Application of Smith,
481 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A., 1973). ("[An] important purpose of § 112, first paragraph … is the definition
of the attributes which a patent specification must possess as of the filing date to be entitled to that
filing date as a prima facie date of invention.") Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
8
DeAnn Foran Smith, Evolving Issues In The Written Description Requirement, in PREPARING
PATENT LEGAL OPINIONS 2006, (2006).
9
JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
10
LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
11
Id. at 1378.
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applicable to the written description and claim construction. Section II discusses
the factual and legal issues of the JVW and LizardTech cases. Section III discusses
Circuit Judge Rader’s rationale for the “Evolving Written Description Doctrine”
and the role the judicial doctrine of possession has to the “Evolving Written
Description Doctrine.” Section IV concludes with commentary from the viewpoint
of a practitioner examining the roles that Congress and the Federal Circuit have in
promulgating the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the interpretative
judicial doctrines.
II.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Introduction and Role of the Written Description
1.

The Statutory Basis for a Written Description

A patent application is a written document crafted to meet the legal
requirements of a specification and drawings for an invention.12 The United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) reviews patent applications
according to Patent Law under 35 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq., the Patent Rules, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1, et. seq., and the Manual for Patent Examining Procedures, a detailed guide
written for examiners by the Patent Office.13 A drawing is often helpful to describe
an invention, but pictures can show only so much. Thus, patent law requires that
the specification describe the invention in writing, rather than by pictures alone.14
The patent rules also require drawings that show every feature of the invention
specified in the claims.15 Only on rare occasions is a drawing sufficient to support
an otherwise imprecise patent application.16
2.

Describing the Invention

“A patentee has the right to be his own lexicographer.”17 This phrase dates

12

35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006).
"The patent law is Title 35 of the United States Code which governs all cases in the U.S. P.T.O."
Introduction, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (Patent and Trademark Office (8th ed. rev 6
2007)). The U.S. P.T.O. may "establish regulations … for the conduct of proceedings in the U.S.
P.T.O." 35 U.S.C. § 2. "[I]n the Code of Federal Regulations the rules pertaining to patents are in Parts
1, 3, 4, 5, and 10 of Title 37." Id. "This Manual is published to provide … patent examiners, applicants,
attorneys, agents, and representatives of applicants with a reference work on the practices and
procedures relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO." Forward, Manual of
Patent Examining Procedures (8th ed. rev. 6 2007).
14
37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2000).
15
37 C.F.R. § 1.83(a) (2000).
16
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing invalidity for
reliance on drawing and remanded to determine the sufficiency of the drawing to §112.). See also,
Lance Leonard Barry, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 76 J. OF PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1994).
17
Esnault-Pelterie v. United States, 81 Ct.Cl. 785, * (1935) *Publication page references are not
available for this document. The United States Court of Claims preceded the Court of Customs and
13
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back several decades as a judicial doctrine allowing a patentee to use words of the
patentee’s own choosing to describe the invention in the specification, even if the
meaning contradicts the ordinary meaning.18 Even so, patent practice is not as
flexible. The patent rules require the specification to include a brief and detailed
written description with drawings. 19 Patent law requires the specification conclude
with the claims.20 Furthermore, the specification must describe the invention “in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms, to enable any person skilled in the art . . .
to make and use [the invention,] . . . and shall set forth the best mode.21 These
clauses describe the definiteness requirement, the enablement requirement and the
best mode requirement, respectively. Together they serve as notice to the public of
the claimed invention.22 Additionally, these clauses as a whole must meet the
adequacy requirement of the specification.23
The Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art, often abbreviated by the
letters, PHOSITA, is someone with practical experience in the field of the
invention. In some fields, such a person might have practical on-the-job training,
while other fields may require many years of academic and technical training.24
Lastly, the claims must “particularly point . . . out and distinctly claim . . . the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”25
3.

Preventing “New Matter” From Being Claimed

The patent laws and rules also include several express requirements
regarding prosecution. For instance, a patentee can rely on information in prior
inventions and filed documents for the enablement requirement.26 A patentee may
also rely on “incorporation by reference” for information of previously filed
applications.27 The “no new matter” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132 limits
incorporation by reference to documents known before the initial filing.28 As such,
the last sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 132 expressly restricts this requirement to

Patent Appeals in hearing patent appeals, with appellate division of the former and the latter court now
merged into the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For a brief history of patent law and the
courts, see www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html and www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/
historyofcourt.html.
18
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
19
37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2005).
20
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006).
21
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
22
All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc. 309 F.3d 774, 779-780 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
23
Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods, Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1994)).
24
Kistler Instrumente AG v. United States, 1979 WL 16488, at 15 (Ct.Cl. Trial Div. 1979).
25
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006).
26
The specification includes a section called "Background of the Invention" for discussing prior
inventions, which are called "prior art." 37 C.F.R. § 1.77. A patent application does not have to educate
the person having ordinary skill in the art since such a person is presumed to have "all relevant prior art
before him." See Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Pneumafil Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (D.C.N.C. 1985),
aff’d and vacated in part as moot, 824 F.2d 979 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
27
37 C.F.R. § 1.57 (2004).
28
35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006).
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amendments, i.e., documents filed during prosecution.29 The no new matter
requirement also applies to documents filed before or with the application where
the application relies on a patent application that did not issue until after the filing
date, and were therefore unknown to a person skilled in the art at the time of
filing.30
B. Introduction to the Claim
1.

A Brief History of Claims

Patent law instruction, like most modern legal instruction programs, omits
historical considerations as such information is usually not legally significant. In
the context of patent doctrine, a brief history of the patent claim helps explain the
policy behind the doctrine.
The . . . Patent Act of 1793 did not require claims, but did require, in its 3d section,
that the patent applicant “deliver a written description of his invention, and of the
manner of using, or process of compounding, the same, in such full, clear and exact
terms, as to distinguish the same from all things before known, and to enable any
person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make, compound and use the same. . .” [The] view of this
language [was] that the specification of a patent had two objects. [F]irst . . . “to
enable artizans to make and use [the invention]False [and] second . . . to put the
public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention” [It] guard[s]
against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may
otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented. It is, therefore, for the purpose of
warning an innocent . . . person using a machine, of his infringement of the patent;
and at the same time, of taking from the inventor the means of . . . pretending that
his invention is more than what it really is. [That is] . . . the patentee is required to
31
distinguish his invention in his specification.

In fact, “[c]laim practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the
passage of the Act of July 4, 1836, and inclusion of a claim did not become a
statutory requirement until 1870.”32 As the discussion below shows, even while
discussing the meaning of the claims, the basis of much of the subsequent case law
focused on the discussion of the invention rather than the claims. Thus, the next
one hundred years did not bring about many seminal claim related cases. One
outfall of this focus on the written description is that at least one influential patent
law text shows about one-third of all seminal patent cases date from after 1970,
and particularly since 1996.33

29

Id.
In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (disallowing certain patent applications filed
before the patent at issue, on grounds that the patents did not issue until after the filing date, and were
therefore not known to a person skilled in the art at the time of filing).
31
Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560-61 (citing Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 430-433 (1822)).
32
Markman, 517 U.S. at 379 (citations omitted).
33
The reader is directed to the highlighted cases in the Table of Cases (pp. xxvii-xliii) of CRAIG
ALAN NARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, (2d ed. 2001).
30
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Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law

One of the difficulties in a patent case is deciding what the inventor
considered as the invention at the time of filing the application. The judicial
process of determining the meaning of the claims is “claim construction.” The
technology is at times difficult for the lawyers to understand and even more so for
the court. Juries struggled for years with claim construction until the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Markman that claim construction was a question of law rather than a
factual question for the jury.34 Decided now by the court as a matter of law, the
judicial process of claim construction is a Markman hearing. The importance of the
Markman case is both its question of law ruling and its rationale. The Court stated
in Markman that claim construction, as a matter of law, is important for uniformity
in patent cases.35
The Court’s premise was that, “treating interpretive issues as purely legal will
promote . . . intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority
36
of the single appeals court.”

As the Court noted, this was the same rationale used by Congress for
creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.37 To this goal, the Court’s
rationale was to ensure a proposed definition fully comports with the specification
and claims, and avoids leaving evidentiary questions of meaning wide open in
every new court in which a patent might be litigated.38
3.

The Fine Art of Claim Construction

Claim construction must begin with the words of the claims themselves.39
The court will first view the claims in the ordinary and customary meaning of a
person having skill in the art at the time of invention.40 Complicating claim
construction is that the format of the claims usually prevents an explanation in the
claims of their meaning. This format often requires reliance on the written
description.41 Both claim construction and the adequacy requirement focus on the
skill of an ordinary person in the art to understand the written description.42 Thus,
claim construction depends on the field of art and the context of the patent.43

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 390-91.
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id.
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Role of the Specification to Claim Construction

While claim construction is a question of law,44 patent “compliance with the
written description requirement is a question of fact”45 that “depends on what is
claimed and what is described.”46 To have valid claims to different forms of the
invention, the patentee must expressly claim the invention with terms that provide
the broadest interpretation of invention. This makes claim construction more art
than science as the court often must infer what the patentee attempts to define as
the invention. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clearly stated that
each claim construction case is particular to the patent at issue rather than to
judicial decisions on claim construction as a whole.47 Thus, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit cautions against reading too much into claim construction
from one patent to another.48
If the specification is not clear enough, other sources are available. On the
intrinsic side, the court may use the prosecution history, if any.49 If the claims are
still ambiguous the court may then use dictionaries and extrinsic evidence such as
treatises, and finally, expert testimony.50 Expert testimony might be used to show
equivalence at the time of invention, or the time of the alleged infringement.51 The
basic rule being whether a person having skill in the art of amusement rides would
know of the equivalence of the claimed and accused inventions.52
C. Patent Claims at Modern Law
1.

Enablement

a. The Statutory Role
As an express component of the patent statutes, enablement was not, by that
term, a hotly debated issue until recently. During the first one hundred years of
patent law after claims became a statutory requirement, courts created the
lexicographer doctrine53 and the prohibition against undue experimentation, which
led to the non-obviousness doctrine, which became a statutory requirement in

44

Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Products, Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
46
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375.
47
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J.,
concurring).
48
Medrad, 401 F.3d at 1318.
49
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
50
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 457 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
51
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950);
Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton-Davis, 520 U.S. 17, 29, 40, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997).
52
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950).
53
Esnault-Pelterie v. United States, 81 Ct.Cl. 785 (1935).
45
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1952.54 Interestingly, these two judicial doctrines laid the foundation for the
present-day controversy.55
Even without judicial interpretation, the enablement requirement seems plain
enough.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
56
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.

As the applicable role of the judiciary is statutory interpretation, the patent bar
looks to the courts for useful clarification.57 In fact, the leading case on enablement
stated enablement as a simple requirement. “The specification contains a written
description of the invention[,] which must be clear and complete enough to enable
those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it.”58
b. The Judicial Role
The history of the expressions, “full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” and “to
enable any person skilled in the art” shows that the written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 has not been an easy interpretation.59 For example, “any person
skilled in the art” in the statute becomes “those of ordinary skill in the art” in
judicial doctrine.60 Furthermore, “to enable any person skilled in the art” means
“without requiring undue experimentation.”61 In the most succinct of explanations
available, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarized the requirement
by saying, “the first paragraph requires that the specification describe the invention
set forth in the claims.”62
2.

Definiteness

Despite the focus on the written description, in infringement litigation, “the
name of the game is the claim.”63 While paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms of the specification as a whole,” the second
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claim shall “particularly point[] out

54

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
A careful delineation of case law reveals that the lexicographer doctrine led to the Markman
holding, with the undue experimentation prohibition leading to non-obviousness test and the possession
test.
56
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
57
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
58
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
59
35 U.S.C § 112 (2006).
60
Id.; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
61
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2006).
62
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63
In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., quoting Judge Giles
Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims--American Perspectives, 21 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)).
55
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and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”64 Thus, the claims are what determine the scope of the patent, not the
rest of the specification.
Unfortunately, the Patent Office requires that a claim shall be only a single
sentence describing the invention.65 Consequently, a claim is often a long run-on
sentence that is contrary to the proper rules of grammar and makes claim
interpretation much like reading an engineering technical manual.66 Providentially,
each patent is limited to describing a single invention, and each claim is limited to
describing a single embodiment of the invention.67
3.

Best Mode

The best mode requirement looks at three factors. First, the specification
must disclose the most useful form of the invention.68 Second, the knowledge and
belief of the inventor must be the basis for this form.69 The third factor looks at the
first two factors as of the filing date.70
4.

The Judicial Doctrine of Possession

a. Supporting the Written Description
Possession is not a statutory requirement, but a judicial doctrine.71 As noted
above, an early patent case described possession from the viewpoint of the public.
“[A] patent had two objects, . . . first. . . ‘to enable artisans to make and use [the

64

An important distinction is that the statutory basis for the claims is 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2006).
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (8th ed. rev 6 2007).
66
Fressola v. Manbeck, 1995 WL 656874 (D.D.C., 1995) (Challenging Manual of Patent
Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) on grounds that the "one-sentence requirement bears no reasonable
relationship to the language of and policies behind 35 U.S.C. § 112." Id. at 1. Denied on grounds, "the
one-sentence rule fits much more comfortably into the "procedural" box than the "substantive" one." Id.
at 4.)
67
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §806.03 (8th ed. rev 3 2006).
68
Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. l996) (holding that the
inventor cannot disclose one embodiment of the invention and refrain from disclosing the best mode for
commercialization).
69
Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049-52 (Fed.Cir. l995) (holding that the
knowledge of the assignee is not imputed to the inventor).
70
W. L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that
the best mode requirement applies to the inventor's knowledge as of the filing date). See also Transco
Products Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 556-559 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding the
relevant date for evaluating a best mode disclosure in continuation practice is the date of the parent
application and citing Dow Chemical Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 615 F.Supp. 471, 482, 229
U.S.P.Q. 171, 179 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 617 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987) (holding the appropriate date for determining compliance with the best mode requirement for a
reissue application is the filing date of the original application and not that of the reissue application)).
71
"The courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement
issue in a variety of ways." Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163.02 (8th ed. rev 5 2006).
"[T]o satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and
that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed." Id. (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,
935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
65
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invention]’False [and] second . . . ‘to put the public in possession of what the party
claims as his own invention.’”72
Then, in 1991, possession took on another meaning. In Vas-Cath, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tried to argue a dichotomy in the court over the
roles of enablement and the written description with this statement. “[T]he
applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as
of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”73
In doing so, the court seemingly created a new doctrine that required, as of
the filing date, the applicant (i.e., the application) used “reasonable clarity,” to
inform the person having ordinary “skill in the art,” of the invention.74 The
problem here is that the enablement requirement requires that the written
description is clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art
to make and use it.75 By including the phrases, “with reasonable clarity,” and
“skilled in the art” with the word possession, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit created a new doctrine (test) of possession without answering the question
of how enablement relates to the written description.76 Focused still on the
confusion over enablement and the written description, the court sought to clarify
the matter. “There appears to be some confusion in our decisions concerning the
extent to which the ‘written description’ requirement is separate and distinct from
the enablement requirement. The purpose of the written description requirement of
section 112, first paragraph is to state what is needed to fulfill the enablement
criteria.”77 While perceiving the confusion as between enablement and the written
description, the court added a new doctrine of possession for supporting the written
description requirement.
With uncertainty still reigning several years later, the court again attempted
to make a distinction. “[T]here is no question that . . . written description and
enablement are separate statutory requirements, and that written description is not
simply a facet of enablement.”78 Not only did the court not clarify the requirements
of written description and enablement, the court again failed to define what it
meant by possession. Fortunately, a review of applicable case law shows that there
are three facets to possession. These are the filing date, the scope of enablement,
and predictably of the art.
b. The Filing Date
Patent applications often rely on earlier applications to take advantage of the
earlier filing date to pre-date prior art.79 Such instances also occur in division or

72

Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-61 (citing Evans, 20 U.S. at 430-33 (1822)).
Id. at 1563-64 (emphasis added).
74
Id.
75
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
76
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64.
77
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (emphasis added).
78
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
79
Application of John P. Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1233 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (possession applied to
growth of crystals seeking earlier filed patent applications as enabling art). Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156
73
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continuation practice,80 interference practice81 or in ex parte challenges where the
patentee added the claim at issue subsequent to the application.82 Such practice is
also common in the filing of provisional applications and in applications seeking
the benefit of foreign filed applications in what is called a ‘right of priority.’83 As
such, the first facet of possession looks to whether at the filing date of an earlier
document, the earlier document adequately instructs persons ordinarily skilled in
the art to understand the later claimed invention in the later filed application.84
c. Scope of Enablement
The scope of enablement facet of possession is likely what contributed to the
confusion with the enablement requirement. The scope of enablement delineates
whether what the inventor later claims as invented (i.e., in litigation) is a defined
embodiment of the disclosure, claims and prosecution history.85 By scope of
enablement, possession means a claim may not be vague or read as broader than
the supporting disclosure.86
In Enzo Biochem, the court looked at whether the written description on the
activity levels of the claimed nucleotides supported the claimed bacteria detection
inventions.87 While the written description reported in an activity level of greater
than five, some of the claims had much higher activity levels, and other claims
referred to the inventions Enzo Biochem had deposited with a public
organization.88 In a case of first impression, the court stated that “the mere
appearance of vague claim language in an original claim or as part of the
specification [does not] necessarily satisf[y] the written description requirement or
show[] possession of a generic invention.”89 At least for the then new field of

F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (possession applied to surgical technique seeking earlier filing date of
the parent application).
80
Division practice refers to the splitting of one application containing two or more inventions into
multiple applications. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). Continuation practice refers to the filing of an
application to supplant an earlier application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2007).
81
Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d
1035, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
82
Enzo Biochem. Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J,
concurring).
83
35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006).
84
Application of Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Reversing a rejection for
inadequacy on grounds that an earlier application relied on as a reference did not provide an adequate
descriptive for the make and use requirement of 25 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1). Said another way: "[T]hat
requirement evidences appreciation of an important purpose of § 112, first paragraph, which is the
definition of the attributes which a patent specification must possess as of the filing date to be entitled
to that filing date as a prima facie date of invention." Application of Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding that the how-to-use requirement was satisfied where there was no basis upon
which to question use of all polymers within claimed genus, and where scope of genus was
commensurate with specification disclosure).
85
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Markman,
52 F.3d at 979-81 (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
86
Id. at 1473 (holding the location of controls as limited to the console as "[n]o similar variation
beyond the console is even suggested").
87
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 960-62.
88
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 962.
89
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 972 (holding that "reference in the specification to a deposit in a
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genetic engineering, the court held that “[i]nventions that cannot reasonably be
enabled by a description in written form in the specification, but that otherwise
meet the requirements for patent protection, may be described in surrogate form by
a deposit that is incorporated by reference into the specification.”90
In Enzo Biochem, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit effectively
upheld the possession requirement in a case that did not involve priority.91 In a
harbinger of the 2005-2006 cases discussed below, the Enzo Biochem dissent
questioned the court’s decision not to hear the case en banc, as well as the court’s
use of the possession test.92
d. Predictability of the Art
The last facet of possession is whether the written description adequately
discusses the claims for a person having skill in the art to understand all details of
all embodiments in sufficient detail without undue experimentation, what the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has called “predictability of the relevant art.”93
In fact, the Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit has applied the possession
doctrine almost exclusively to the complex, high-technology cases in the fields of
material science, chemistry and biology, where the state of the art is rapidly
changing.94 In these fields, a broadly-defined invention called the genus includes
one or more narrowly-broadly defined inventions called the species.95 Such
inventions are common in genetic engineering.96
Predictability looks beyond the written description to the knowledge of the
person having skill in the field of science. This allows a patentee to rely on the
knowledge of peers to understand how to make and use the invention.97 In this
respect, the patentee can focus on the invention while expending less effort and

public depository, which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in
written form, constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the
written description requirement of § 112, para. 1", and denying a petition for en banc rehearing)
(emphasis added).
90
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 966.
91
Id. at 960.
92
Id. at 988 (Linn, J., dissenting).
93
Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir.1991)).
94
1970’s - Chemistry: Application of Smith, 481 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A., 1973) (cationically active
"living" polymers). Application of John P. Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (growth of crystals).
1990’s - Material science in surgical devices: Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1991) and Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (genetic inventions).
95
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966-67. See e.g., Genus-Species Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures § 715.03, Markush Claims Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 803.02, and Standard
for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures § 2163.02 (8th ed. rev 6 2007).
96
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (possession applied to genetic
engineering). See also In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (The application at issue was titled,
"Hybrid Genes Incorporating a DNA Fragment Containing a Gene Coding for an Insecticidal Protein,
Plasmids, Transformed Cyanobacteria Expressing Such Protein and Method for Use as a Biocontrol
Agent").
97
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing AK Steel Corp. v.
Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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funds documenting the knowledge of the person having ordinary skill in the art.98
For example, in Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, Bilstead’s application related to an
“apparatus for sterilizing three-dimensional objects using ionizing radiation
without affecting the target objects in a deleterious manner.”99 At issue was
whether the patent application had to “describe every embodiment within the range
of two to infinity to support the count.”100 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had not
considered: “[W]hether [the] disclosure of manipulation in a small number of
directions would reasonably convey to a person skilled in the relevant art that
Bilstad had possession of manipulation in a plurality of directions as of his filing
date.”101
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit therefore vacated the judgment
of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and remanded for further
proceedings.102 The court’s rationale was that not every specification needs the
complete detail of every embodiment in the specification.103 This view does not
apply to genetic engineering, where a description of a single species is insufficient
for a claim to the genus, or for a description of the genus to claim the species,
without a description of the species in the specification.104
Practitioners should note that while the possession test is not codified in law
or through the rules, the Patent Office is including it in its examiner training under
the “Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under 35 U.S.C. 112,
paragraph 1, Written Description Requirement.”
The purpose of the written description analysis is to confirm that applicant had
possession of what is claimed. The Guidelines . . . instruct the examiner to look for
consistency between a claim and what provides adequate factual support for the
claim as judged by one of ordinary skill in the art from reading the corresponding
105
written description.

To assure the reader that the possession versus enablement confusion is still
not yet corrected, the Patent Office provides this clarification: “The written
description requirement, a question of fact, ensures that the inventor conveys to
others that he or she had possession of the claimed invention; whereas, the
enablement requirement, a question of law, ensures that the inventor conveys to

98
Whether billed by the hour or by the page, patent applications are time consuming and usually
long. Applicants often file Information Disclosure Statements to separately provide that state of the art
knowledge. On a related, but opposite side of the patenting coin is the Winslow test for obviousness.
"[P]icture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references – which he is presumed to
know – hanging on the walls around him." In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1021 (CCPA 1966) (Rich, J.)
99
Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1118 .
100
Id. at 1123.
101
Id. at 1126.
102
Id. at 1127.
103
Id. at 1123-24 (citing In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
104
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
105
66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1100 at Comment (1), U.S. Dept. of Comm., U.S.P.T.O. (2001) (emphasis
added). See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163 (8th ed. rev. 6 (2007)).
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others how to make and use the claimed invention.”106
In all, perhaps the best explanation this author found is still from the 2003
Amgen Court:
The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an applicant from
later asserting that he invented that which he did not; the applicant for a patent is
therefore required to “recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can
107
be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.

While this is not the last word on the possession test in this article, the
discussion of the evolution of the possession test is sufficient to introduce the
Evolving Written Description Doctrine.
III. THE BACKGROUND CASES
A. Introduction to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine
In January 2006, Circuit Judge Rader dissented in the rehearing denial of
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., with an admonishment of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for making what were, in his view, two
contradictory rulings.108 In October 2005, a panel of the court had held in JVW
Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc.,109 that the claims can be broadly
read to include an embodiment even if the embodiment is not expressly supported
by the specification.110 The next day, a panel of different judges held in
LizardTech that a claim is invalidated if all elements are not supported by the
specification.111 On appeal by LizardTech for a re-hearing, the en banc court
affirmed.112 In dissent to the en banc decision, Circuit Judge Rader called the court
to task for allowing the JVW patentee to assert an embodiment the specification did
not describe, while the court invalidated a claim that prevented the LizardTech
patentee from doing the same thing.113 Circuit Judge Rader called this apparent
inconsistency the “evolving written description doctrine.”114 A minimally technical
review is warranted as the art and facts of these cases are sufficiently different to
affect the arguments.

106
66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1100 at Comment (4), U.S. Dept. of Comm., U.S.P.T.O. (2001). See also
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163 (8th ed. rev. 6 (2007)).
107
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousse, Inc., l314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing VasCath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
108
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376.
109
JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
110
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376.
111
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1336.
112
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376.
113
Id. at 1377.
114
Id. at 1377.
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B. JVW and the Imported Function Doctrine
1.

The Patent at Issue: U.S. 4,494,754

JVW owns United States Patent No. 4,494,754115 for an I-beam shaped
device used for holding a video game controller.116 The invention relieves the user
from having to manually hold the game controller during play. The patent claims
an upper horizontal platform to hold the game controller that includes a “means for
lockably receiving a video game controller in fixed position” on a mounting
member.117 The patent claims both the video game controller holder, and ways of
using the video game controller holder.118 While there are several drawings in the
patent, every drawing shows the invention holding the same Atari joystick
controller with the embodiments differing by how the user sat with the invention.
2.

Claim Construction and the District Court Ruling

a. Claim Construction
JVW sued Interact, a video game device manufacturer, for infringement by
the Interact V3 and V4 steering wheel video game controllers.119 One point of
contention in this case is that the patent shows an external holder for a video game
controller, while the accused devices are video game controllers.120 In the patent,
the “means” shown “for lockably receiving a video game controller in fixed
position” are four flexible L-shaped clips outside the video game controller shown
in the drawing.121 In its claim construction ruling, the district court considered this
arrangement of the clips and the controller a necessary “interlace,” but
acknowledged that the game controller was not part of the invention.122

115

Apparatus For Playing Home Video Game, U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 (issued Jan. 2, 1985).
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Fig. 1 and 2..
117
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Col. 4. ll. 1-2 and ll. 33-35. "Mounting member" refers to the upper
flat portion of the I-shaped invention. This is a classic "means-plus-function" claim under 35 U.S.C. §
112, para. 6 (2006). The claim must describe a function of the invention, and provide an element in the
invention to perform that function.
118
Independent claims 1 and 5 provided different embodiments for the user to kneel or sit on the
lower horizontal platform. U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Col. 3. ll. 47-48 (Claim 1), and Col. 4 ll. 27-29
(Claim 5), and Col. 3, ll. 17-27 (describing Figures 4, 5 and 6.) Any use of the patented invention
without a license is an infringement of the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). One goal of a patent is to
provide as many variations of the invention as possible to provide protection for different uses. Claims
for making or using an invention are best suited where the invention is not patentable for some reason.
The issue in JVW is ironic in that the patent provides fewer embodiments of the invention holding the
game controller than how the user is positioned for holding the invention.
119
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1327.
120
See Figure 1 below for a side by side comparison.
121
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, figs. 2 and 3, col. 2, ll. 39-45, col. 3. l. 50 col. 4. l. 2, and col. 4. ll.
33-35.
122
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1328 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., No. 00CV-1867 (D. Md. May 9, 2002) ("Supplemental Memorandum and Order Re Patent Claim
Construction")). There is disagreement in the patent bar, and on the bench, whether the accused product
has a role in claim construction. Some courts perform claim construction 'blind' to the features of the
116
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In the Interact models, the allegedly infringing clips are inside the housing of
the video game controller.123 For JVW to succeed in its infringement action, JVW
would have to prove that the Interact models infringe the patent by using identical
or similar clips and that whether the clips were inside or outside the housing is
irrelevant.124
Another claim construction issue was the district court’s interpretation of “in
fixed position” and “means for lockably receiving” to require the invention to lock
and unlock the controller in position.125 The specification lacked an express
statement of how to remove the controller so the district court viewed the clips as
immovable unless removed.126 In addition, the district court interpreted the
pronounced horizontal portions of the L-clips as restraining the controller
vertically as well as from side to side.127
b. Holding by the District Court
One aspect that distinguishes the V3 and V4 video game controllers are the
separable shells that move the clips away from the steering wheel to unlock and
adjust the video game controller.128 Since this made the clips movable, the district
court held there was no infringement as the V3 and V4 video game controllers
lacked the interlace structure and the immovable function of the patented device.129
3.

Errors by the District Court

On appeal by JVW, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2005)
agreed that the “means for lockably receiving” claim was a valid means plus
function claim.130 The court held though, that the district court’s claim
construction violated two rules of means plus function interpretation.131 First, “a
court may not construe a means-plus-function limitation ‘by adopting a function

accused product.
123
Id. at 1327 ("The V3 utilizes plastic clips mounted inside a shell that surrounds a steering wheel
column.").
124
Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 ("Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent
claim ‘covers the alleged infringer's product or process.’"); JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1333 ("The fact
that the V3 adds a shell to allow the steering wheel height to be adjusted and a cam mechanism to
provide a mechanical way to tighten and loosen the clips does not mean that the clips do not lock the
steering wheel in a fixed position.").
125
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1328 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., No. 00CV-1867 (D, Md. Feb. 1, 2002) ("Memorandum and Order Re Patent Claim Construction")).
126
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1329.
127
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show controller holders 21-24 in the same L-shape pattern and same 4-side
configuration, This is the only, and stated, preferred embodiment of the invention. U.S. Patent No.
4,494,754, col. 3, ll. 28-36.
128
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1329.
129
Id. at 1329.
130
Id. at 1329 ("The parties agree, as do we, that "means for lockably receiving a video game
controller in fixed position on said mounting member" is a means-plus-function limitation recognized
by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6."). A means plus function claim allows a patentee to claim multiple
embodiments through a specific format. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006).
131
"The first construction violated two tenets governing the determination of function in a meansplus-function limitation." Id. at 1331.
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different from that explicitly recited in the claim.’”132 The court found that the
district court had confused the separate functions of “fixed position” and “lockably
receiving.” The claims do not require the invention to both hold in place and
unlock the video game controller.133 Thus, the district court erred in finding an
interlacing of parts to lock and unlock the controller.134
The second rule is that a court may not “import[] the functions of a working
device into the . . . specific claims,” but must “read[] the claims for their meaning
independent of any working embodiment.”135 The court found that the district
court had read into the claims a function for the L-shaped controller holders to
“lock a controller into a fixed position by preventing linear, up and down
movement of the [controller].”136 However, the claimed function is only to
“lockably receiv[e] a video game controller in fixed position,” without regard to
the direction of how the clips kept the controller from moving.137 The limitations
imbued by the district court were merely functions of the separate structural
elements present in the preferred embodiment138 to facilitate the claimed function
to “lockably receiv[e] a video game controller in fixed position.”139 Since these
were not claimed functions, the district court erred in requiring them. The
invention merely has to lock the controller in place, irrespective of the direction of
limited motion.140
4.

Infringement Analysis

With a crucial exception, the Interact V3 and V4 video game controllers are
quite alike. The V3 has L-shaped clips that surround the steering wheel column
while the V4 has a donut shaped plate. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (2005) found that the L-shaped clips on the accused V3 product performed
the same function and were identical or equivalent to the L-shaped clips of the
patent, and thus, the V3 model infringed the patent.141
With its donut-shaped plates surrounding the metal shaft, the V4 locks the
controller from rotational motion rather than locking the controller from horizontal
and vertical motion.142 Thus, the V4 did not infringe the patent as “the structures
clearly perform the claimed function in substantially different ways.”143
Interact argued for non-infringement on grounds that the video game
132
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331 (citing Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d
1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
133
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331 ("[I]n its first construction the district court impermissibly added
unclaimed functional limitations of "unlocking" and "releasing" the video game controller.").
134
Id. at 1330.
135
Id. at 1331 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
136
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335.
137
U.S. Patent No 4,494,754 col. 3 l. 50-col. 4 l. 2, col. 4 ll. 33-35.
138
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col. 3 ll. 28-36.
139
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col. 3 l. 50, col. 4 l.2, col. 4 ll. 33-35.
140
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331.
141
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1333.
142
Id. at 1335.
143
Id. at 1335 (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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controllers are not intended “for playing a video game without any additional
accessory,” while the only embodiment shown in the patent is a holder of video
game controllers.144 The court disagreed, saying it “would be improper” to “import
limitations into claims from . . . embodiments appearing only in a patent’s written
description . . . unless the specification makes clear that “the patentee . . . intends
for the claims and the embodiments in the specification to be strictly
coextensive.”145
The court opined that “after reviewing the specification, we conclude that the
patentee did not intend for the claims and the embodiments disclosed in the
specification to be coextensive.”146 This meant the court was willing to accept a
broad view of the claims even though the written description did not support such a
view because the patent did not express the narrow view argued by Interact. The
reader may note the court reversed the district court’s construction for interlacing
and directionally applied locking for the same reason.147 While the opinion did not
expressly state to what part of the specification the court was referring to, this
author believes the court merely compared Figure 5 to the Interact video game
controllers. This author prepared such a comparison, which is Figure 1 below this
section. The reader will likely note the striking similarities.
5.

Discussion and Summary on JVW

There are two problems with the court’s decision. For one, the holding of
infringement by the V3 ignores that the court went inside the V3 to find the
infringing L-clips. Logically, a video game controller cannot infringe a device
intended to hold the video game controller. This is analogous to looking inside the
Atari controller shown in the drawings and finding infringement. This is the prior
art-infringement dichotomy of “that which infringes if later, would anticipate if
earlier.”148 As such, the court could have affirmed the district court holding of noninfringement, and invalidated the patent as anticipated by the Atari controller.149
The second problem is the court’s finding of the V3 as infringing, but the V4
as not infringing. The court described the patented invention as one which “the
player may sit or kneel on the base of the accessory with his or her legs on either
side of the riser,” [with] “the controller [] held in place by the controller holders
and stabilized using the player’s weight.”150 As noted above, the court apparently
saw the striking similarity of the V3 to the JVW patented invention. As a matter of
law, the finding of infringement is consistent with the purpose of the means-plusfunction limitation and the doctrine of equivalents to prevent such subversion of
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Id. at 1335.
Id.; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (en banc).
146
Id. at 1335.
147
Id. at 1331 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
148
Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
149
We can only speculate what might have happened had the same panel judges as LizardTech
made the decision.
150
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1327 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col.3 ll.13-28, col.1 ll.42- 47).
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patented ideas by insubstantial differences.151 A finding of non-infringement by
the V3 would allow the wholesale copying of patented devices.
The finding of non-infringement for the V4 model is somewhat perplexing.
The two models are identical except for the ability of the V4 to “lock a controller
into a fixed position by preventing rotational movement of the steering wheel unit
on the shaft.”152 The JVW patent does not claim a limitation to only “lock a
controller into a fixed position by preventing linear, up and down movement of the
steering wheel column.”153 This is the limitation of the preferred embodiment Lclips, shown for “lockably receiving [an Atari] video game controller in fixed
position.”154 The court said that the district court erred by imputing a strict locking
function of the L-clips to the patented invention.155 Yet, the court distinguished the
linear locking function of the patented invention as justifying non-infringement by
the V4.156 If the court can see through the distinction that Interact copied the whole
of the JVW patented device for the V3, why did the court not see that the donutshaped plates of the V4 were merely a means for “lockably receiving [the Interact
V4] video game controller in fixed position?”157
Figure 1. Comparative Diagram of JVW158 and Interact V3159

U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 figure 5 compared the Interact V3 (Image
©Amazon.com)
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Id. at 1333 (citing Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1267).
Id. at 1335.
153
Id. at 1335.
154
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col. 4 ll. 1-2.
155
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335. For purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), the drawings are part of
the written description. In other regards, the drawings are t rules make a separate requirement. 35
U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (2006).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 fig. 5.
159
Image (http://ec1.images-amazon.com/images/P/B00000JDDY.01._SS500_SCLZZZZZZZ_.gif)
available at http://www.amazon.com/Interact-SV280-V3-Racing-Wheel/dp/B00000JDDY (last visited
Mar. 18, 2007).
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C. LizardTech And The Possession Test160
1.

The Patent At Issue: U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835

LizardTech, Inc. is the exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835
(issued January 20, 1998) for use of a set of mathematical formulas in software,
called Digital Wavelet Transform algorithms, which compress digital images
without creating fuzzy edges.161 If the reader were to look at the software code that
makes a digital image, the reader would find many rows and columns of digital
data, as if looking at a giant Sudoku puzzle.162 The LizardTech patented method
mathematically divided the image into a mosaic of digital tiles before running the
non-patented software algorithms.163 LizardTech alleged infringement by the
competing Earth Resource Mapping (ERM) method (“ER Mapper”), which ran
each individual row and column of digital data through the non-patented software
algorithms.164
2.

Claim Construction Issues165

The parties litigated the patent through two hearings and three appeals
without going to trial.166 The first hearing related to claim construction of the term
“tile” as used in the patent.167 The district court (in 2000) held that the LizardTech
tile method did not include the single pixel row method used by ERM and granted
summary judgment to ERM for non-infringement.168 On appeal by LizardTech (in
2002), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this claim
construction, and rejected alternative arguments by ERM that the terms “selected
sequence” and “maintaining updated sums” excluded the ER Mapper method.169
Even so, the appeal ruling did not help Lizardtech. On remand, the district
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LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
162
The district court case (cited infra) as well as Deposition of Stuart Nixon provide a brief
discussion of the technology. LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 2000 WL 34502412 (W.D. Wash
2000). The interested reader will find references of varying complexity, including Apparatus for image
manipulation, Everett Truman Eiselen, U.S. Patent 3,976,982 (issued Aug, 24, 1976). The patent at
issue provides a more state of the art discussion. Samples and explanations of Suduko are online at
many sites. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suduko (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
163
LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000). The
reader can simulate the tiling method by marking a grid, such as a 3x3 tic-tac-toe grid, over a picture.
164
Id. A digital image is like a mosaic, but made of dots on the computer screen, called pixels,
rather than of small pictures. The reader can verify this by using the zoom tool of most image-viewing
software to step progressively upwards through the zoom factors. At some point, the image will become
fuzzy with solid squares of color.
165
For clarity, words such as "information, "data, "process" or "method" replace various technical
terms and phrases from the patent and the proceedings that are not significant to the patent principles on
which this discussion focuses.
166
LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
167
Id. at 3.
168
LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681.
169
LizardTech, 35 Fed. Appx. 918 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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court (2004) construed “seamless” such that the ER Mapper method did not follow
the same steps as the patented method.170 Additionally, the district court construed
that the terms “overlapping” and “maintaining updated sums” excluded the ER
Mapper method.171 Thus, “the district court held on summary judgment that ERM
did not infringe claims 1 and 13 of the ‘835 patent.”172
3.

Invalidation for Lacking Possession

Claims 1 and 21 were very similar, and would have been identical, except
that claim 21 lacked the terms, “maintaining updated sums,” “periodically
compressing said sums” and “seamless.”173 This difference in the claims is
acceptable as long as the claims can be read to refer to different inventions, i.e.,
claim 21 cannot be the same invention as claim 1.
Thus, the district court viewed claim 21 as referring to a non-seamless
process.174 The district court also viewed the written description as explaining the
workings of a seamless process, but not explaining a non-seamless process.175 The
court held that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not understand how
to make and use the non-seamless invention.176 For this reason, the district court
held claim 21 and its dependent claims as indefinite and invalid.177
On appeal (2005), LizardTech had a two-fold problem. One problem was
that LizardTech could not argue that claim 21 impliedly included all three missing
elements, as then claim 21 would be the same as claim 1 and still invalid. To avoid
this interpretation, LizardTech argued that based on the entire specification, an
ordinary person skilled in the art would understand that the seamless process
applied also to claim 21.178 Citing the prosecution history, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (2005) agreed with LizardTech.179
There still remained the problem of claim 21 lacking the elements of
“maintaining updated sums” and “periodically compressing said sums.”180 For
claim 21 to be valid, LizardTech had to show the claim could be read to perform a
seamless process without use of “maintaining updated sums,” and “periodically
compressing said sums.”181 The next step is looking to the patent for such “full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art,” how to

170
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1339, 1340-41 (2005). The remand opinion is LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Res. Mapping, Inc., 2004 WL 34502412 (W.D.Wash. March 14, 2004).
171
Id. at 1342-43. See also, Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that a patentee cannot construe a
term to have different meanings in different claims) (citing Hoescht Celanese Corp. v. BP Chem. Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 275 (1996).
172
Id. at 1340-41.
173
Id. at 1343 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343.
177
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343.
178
Id. at 1343.
179
Id. See e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (en banc).
180
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343.
181
Id. at 1344.
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make and use the invention.182 There, the court found a problem. The
“specification provides only a single way of creating a seamless [process], which is
by maintaining updated sums. There is no evidence that the specification
contemplates a more generic way of creating a seamless [process].”183
As this point, the court had clear precedent to invalidate claim 21 based on
the §112(1) enablement clause.184 The court showed this understanding in two
ways. For one, the court cited another enablement case that proved its point.185
Second, the court reiterated enablement as the reason for invalidation. “After
reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand how to make a
seamless [process] generically and would not understand LizardTech to have
invented a method for making a seamless [process], except by ‘maintaining
updating sums.’”186
Instead, the court oddly diverged into the best mode requirement, mixed in
the enablement clause and invoked an old quid pro quo case.187 As though to
justify this mix, the court then once again linked the enablement clause to the
possession doctrine. “Those two requirements usually rise and fall together. [A]
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim
is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of
the invention, and vice versa.”188
As noted above, the possession test has previously been held only to
complex, high-technology subject matter in the material science, chemistry and
biological arts.189 Here, the court held the possession test to a software patent,
which has not before been subjected to the possession test. In addition, with
apparent knowledge and disregard, the court resurrected the pre-Vas-Cath
enablement-possession confusion.190
Whether the flaw in the specification is regarded as a failure to demonstrate that
the patentee possessed the full scope of the invention recited in claim 21 or a failure
to enable the full breadth of that claim, the specification provides inadequate
support for the claim under section 112, paragraph one.

This statement suffers three problems. First, the court failed to keep written
description and enablement separate as stated by the Moba court.191 Second, the
court failed to provide an interpretation of the judicial and statutory policies the

182

Id (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344.
184
The written description shall provide "the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the
same." 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006).
185
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
186
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added).
187
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344.
188
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added).
189
See supra Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4.
190
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added).
191
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
183
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court was attempting to invoke with the possession doctrine. Lastly, in citing the
missing claim element as the cause of invalidity, the court failed to recognize it
was invoking the requirement that the claims shall “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”192 Presuming that what the court said is true, in prosecution, such a
claim would fail the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2 and
the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 1. Such unsupported
claims are called omnibus claims because “it is indefinite in that it fails to point out
what is included or excluded by the claim language.”193
The seminal case for omnibus claims is O’Reilly v. Morse.194 Morse had
invented the telegraph and sued O’Reilly for infringement of Morse’s eighth claim,
which stated:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible
characters, signs or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power,
195
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.

As here, omnibus claims attempt to provide patent coverage for related
inventions that the inventor has not invented. As Morse claimed, “I do not propose
to limit [my invention to the] specifications and claims.”196 At that time though,
claims were a relatively new addition to patents. Even so, Chief Justice Taney
recognized that “this claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is
outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it.”197 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated the claim.198 The LizardTech court recognized the similarity of the
situation in citing Morse.199
Adopting LizardTech’s argument “would lead to sweeping, overbroad claims
because it would entitle an inventor to a claim scope far greater than what a person
of skill in the art would understand the inventor to possess or what a person of skill
in the art would be enabled to make and use.

So clearly, the court understood that claim 21 was invalid, either by failure
of the enablement clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 1, or the definiteness clause
of paragraph 2. Consequently, the court’s citing of the possession test here is
perplexing.200

192

35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006).
Omnibus Claim, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2173.05(r) (8th ed. rev 6 2007),
(citing Ex parte Fressola, 27 USPQ2d 1608 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1993).
194
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 119-20.
198
Id. at 136-37.
199
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1346.
200
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345.
193

2007

THE “EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE”
4.

25

Per Curiam Denial of Rehearing

LizardTech petitioned for a re-hearing by the court or an en banc appeal.201
The court (2006) denied the petition as did the circuit judges polled for an en banc
appeal.202 Circuit Judge Lourie wrote a concurring opinion, while Circuit Judge
Rader dissented. In the concurrence, Circuit Judge Lourie raised eight arguments
in support of the petition denial. These were:203
(a) Case law has been consistent upholding 35 U.S.C. § 112;
(b) That quid pro quo required a full disclosure;
(c) The disclosure failed to meet the full disclosure requirements;
(d) The facts here are different than in other cases;
(e) The disclosure failed the possession test (without calling it that);
(f) The preferred embodiment did not support the claim;
(g) 35 U.S.C. §132 bars new matter and that 35 U.S.C. §112 does not so
apply, and
(h) The court has at least twice declined to hear a written description case en
banc.
As discussed below, these arguments implicate that the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is both improperly invoking the possession test, and raising the
standard for showing possession. Due to the expansiveness of judicial doctrine in
the opinion, this article will discuss each argument separately.
5.

Concurring Opinion and Counterarguments

a. Does Judicial Doctrine Rule Over the Statute?
The concurrence purportedly supported the invalidation of claim 21. Instead,
it served to show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is divisive in the
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112. First, Circuit Judge Lourie opened his arguments
with judicial doctrine. “Our case law has been quite consistent in holding that the
patent law requires that a patent contain a written description of a claimed
invention independent of the requirements to enable one skilled in the art to make
and use the invention.”204
Second, Circuit Judge Lourie argues that there is by “statute, policy, and
practice,” “a written description [requirement] . . . independent of the requirement
[] to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention.”205 As support,
Circuit Judge Lourie quotes the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, with emphasis
on the “and” between the written description requirement in the statute, and the
enablement clause.206 Circuit Judge Lourie adds two instances of comporting case

201
202
203
204
205
206

LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (denying en banc rehearing).
Id.
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374-76 (Lourie, J., concurring).
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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law.207
However, this first set of arguments suffers from two problems. The first
problem is the choice of order in the arguments. First, rather than citing the statute,
Circuit Judge Lourie cites judicial doctrine (“[o]ur case law has been quite
consistent”), as though judicial doctrine on written description had overruled the
statute, which as yet the court has not done.208 In Marbury, the U.S. Supreme
Court said the role of the judiciary is interpretation, thus the first argument is the
statute, not judicial doctrine.209 Second, these arguments are irrelevant. The
statutory requirements for enablement, best mode and definiteness are not
challenged here, nor have they been recently challenged. In this case, and the other
cases cited here, the parties were not challenging the statutes, but rather the judicial
interpretation of the statute.
b. Applying Quid Pro Quo to the Written Description
Circuit Judge Lourie then cited the quid pro quo doctrine, saying it is selfevident public policy applied to the entirety of the written description.
The whole purpose of a patent specification is to disclose one’s invention to the
public. It is the quid pro quo for the grant of the period of exclusivity. The need to
tell the public what the invention is, in addition to how to make and use it, is selfevident. One should not be able to obtain a patent on what one has not disclosed to
210
the public.

This argument is subject to challenge on multiple fronts. The first challenge
is that quid pro quo as applied to patent law does not involve 35 U.S.C. §112, but
rather the legitimate use of the patent. The first use of quid pro quo arose from the
1836 patent law that “authorized the extension of a patent, on the application of the
executor or administrator of a deceased patentee.”211 However, a licensee of the
patent could not use the extension.212 While the law disappeared, the doctrine did
not. The U.S. Supreme Court later cited the doctrine as justification for the
“exclusive right” exception to monopoly and antitrust law giving a patentee a
limited licensing right without violating the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §1,
et. seq.).213 These cases present the quid pro quo doctrine as a use doctrine, not a
patentability doctrine.
This view is supported by a 1974 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court had
to determine whether federal preemption applies to state laws that protect
unpatentable trade secrets much as patent law would protect them, if they were
207
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374-75 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech
Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 n. 17 (Fed.Cir. 2005), and Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1360
(Fed.Cir. 2005)).
208
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., concurring)
209
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
210
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
211
Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 647 (1846).
212
Woodworth v. Sherman, 30 F. Cas. 586, 589 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1844) (holding, inter alia, that an
assignee could not get an extension since the patentee did not have the right to grant the extension).
213
Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (holding that a consignment license
coerced on lessees is illegal under anti-trust laws).
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patentable.214 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that the limited monopoly of patents, i.e., the open use of the patented
invention, served as an incentive (the quid pro quo) to “full disclosure.” “The
more difficult objective of the patent law to reconcile with trade secret law is that
of disclosure, the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”215
In Kewanee, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that allowing protection of
trade secrets provides the same use incentive to businesses that did not need,
qualify for, or could not afford patent protection.216 The problem before the Court
was how to strike a proper balance between undisclosed, but state protected trade
secrets, and disclosed, but federally protected ideas.
[S]tate rules which would grant such incentives seem to conflict with the economic
quid pro quo underlying patent protection; i.e., a monopoly limited in time, in
return for full disclosure of the invention. Thus[,] federal law has struck a balance
between incentives for inventors and the public’s right to a competitive economy.
217
In this sense, the patent law is an integral part of federal competitive policy.

The difficulty for businesses is that trade secrets can keep a business in
business for decades, as with Coca-Cola, which has been a trade secret for some
120 years.218 A patent, on the other hand, provides only a limited monopoly for a
fraction of that time.219 At expiration, everyone can legally make, sell and use the
invention with impunity.220 Thus, by ruling that federal patent law did not preempt
the state trade secret law, the Kewanee Court affirmed the quid pro quo doctrine as
a balancing factor in the competitive decisions made by businesses of whether to
maintain a trade secret or seek patent protection, without regard to the disclosure of
the application.221
Other cases involving patents have also focused on the individual actions of
the patentee/assignee in competition, rather than on the disclosure.222 In Rite-Hite

214

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 472 (1974).
Id. at 484 (citing Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)).
216
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474.
217
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 497, n.2 (holding that a state law granting monopoly protection to
processes and manufacturing techniques by barring disclosure of unpatentable trade secrets does not
violate federal patent law) (quoting Adelman, Secrecy and Patenting: Some Proposals for Resolving the
Conflict, 1 APLA QUARTERLY JOURNAL 296, 298-99 (1973)).
218
See e.g., The Chronicle Of Coca-Cola, available at http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/
heritage/chronicle_birth_refreshing_idea.html; or The History of Coca Cola, available at
http://inventors.about.com/od/cstartinventions/a/coca_cola.htm. (Last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
219
A patent grants the patentee "the right to exclude others from [importing into,] making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States" for a term of 20 years from the
earlier of the filing or priority date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
220
35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1) (2006)(prohibiting the making, using, offering to sell, sale or importing of
any patented invention within the United States without authority during the term of the patent).
221
The federal trade secret protection statutes, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839, have been on the books
since 1996. Just as with the patent statutes, these statutes do not, and cannot, address the competitive
cost-benefit analysis necessary for whether a business should seek a patent or keep the information a
trade secret. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484-491.
222
See e.g. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1997-02 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that a monopolist's exclusion of others from its intellectual property by refusing to
license or sell its intellectual property is a presumptively valid business justification to exclusionary
215
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(1995), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit placed emphasis of the quid
pro quo doctrine on the marketplace, not patentability.223 Even the most recent
U.S. Supreme Court case has not departed from that role.224
The second difficulty is that cases that have tied quid pro quo to the written
description doctrine have conditioned the link to public use of the invention. In the
first case linking quid pro quo to the written description, a district court applied
quid pro quo to the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.225 In Systematic
Tool & Mach. Co., the district court said that “disclosure of the best method of
performing the task the patent is intended to accomplish [is the] the quid pro quo
for the grant of a legal monopoly over the subject matter, so that the public may
obtain maximum benefits through complete revelation by the patentee.”226
According to the Systematic court, the quid pro quo doctrine focuses on the best
benefit of the invention, not the enablement (make and use) clauses of §112(1).227
Unlike Systematic Tool & Mach. Co., Lizardtech was not a question of validity
under the best mode requirement—which also was not mentioned in the opinion
other than in one short reference.228
Not too long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court looked at the relationship of the
quid pro quo doctrine to the written description.229 In J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the U.S. Supreme Court said that “to obtain a
utility patent, a breeder must describe the plant with sufficient specificity to enable
others to “make and use” the invention after the patent term expires. The
disclosure required by the Patent Act is “the quid pro quo of the right to
exclude.”230
There are, however, distinguishing factors between J. E. M. Ag Supply and
LizardTech. First, in J. E. M. Ag Supply, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the
question of whether newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter
where Congress provides for utility patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, plant patents
under the Plant Protection Act (35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164) and Plant Variety
Certificates under the Plant Variety Protection Act (84 Stat. 1542, as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 2321 et. seq.).231 The patentability question in LizardTech was limited

conduct for any immediate harm to consumers).
223
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that "[t]he
patent system was not designed merely to build up a library of information by disclosure, … but [is] to
get new products into the marketplace during the period of exclusivity so that the public receives full
benefits from the grant") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
224
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that a patent does not
necessarily confer market power upon the patentee and requiring a plaintiff prove a patentee/defendant
has market power in the tying product).
225
The specification shall . . . set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(1) (2006).
226
Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 390 F.Supp. 178, 195-96 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added).
227
Id.
228
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344.
229
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
230
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (emphasis
added) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (1974) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
231
Id. at 127 (holding that newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter of § 101, and
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strictly to the scope of the disclosure in support of the claims.232 Second, in most
patent cases, the Court uses the broader, and more common term, patentee.233
Here, the Court does not refer to a patentee, but to the breeder.234 Thus, the focus
in J. E. M. Ag Supply is not on an inventor, but on a person working with live
biological materials. In addition, plant inventions are subject to the biological
deposit requirement of 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 because of “the practical
difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a written description.”235 A
deposit is not required, optional, or even allowed for a software invention.236
In general, the quid pro quo doctrine is intended to entice a patentee to place
the invention in the marketplace with the limited “right to exclude.”237 The
distinguishing factors between J. E. M. Ag Supply and LizardTech make it clear
that applying quid pro quo to the entirety of the written description must be limited
to the cases where there are “practical difficulties of describing [the invention] in a
written description.”238 Consequently, application of the quid pro quo doctrine to
the possession test is limited to specific subject matter, just as courts in the past
have done for genus-species patents.239
c. Patent Practice
Circuit Judge Lourie then notes that patent applications provide for two parts
in the specification describing the invention, a “substantive portion of a patent
specification” and “a fuller written description of what the invention is.”240 By
substantive portion, Circuit Judge Lourie was referring to the claims, as shown by
the statement that “[a] patent specification always begins with a statement like ‘My
invention consists of.’” 241
Circuit Judge Lourie argues, “[n]o one writes a patent application by
beginning with statements like ‘I make my invention as follows’ or ‘I use my
invention in the following manner.’”242 However, this argument ignores the patent
laws and policy with which Circuit Judge Lourie seeks to support the denial of re-

neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101 coverage).
232
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344-1345.
233
See e.g., Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2005), and eBay Inc v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) LizardTech, 424 F. 3d 1344-1345.
234
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (emphasis
added) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (1974).
235
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 965.
236
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (2001) (limiting deposits to biological materials). The PTO may
require a model. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2007). A model will not otherwise be admitted without approval
from the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.91 (2007). A perpetual motion invention is the only other required
working model. Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.03 (8th ed. rev 6 (2007)).
237
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 497.
238
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 965 (applying quid pro quo to requiring biological deposits when a
written description would be inadequate disclosure).
239
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966-67. See also, Genus-Species Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures § 715.03 and Markush Claims Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 803.02 (8th ed.
rev 6 (2007)).
240
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
241
Id. at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). See also 37 C.F.R. §1.75(e) (2006).
242
Id. at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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hearing.243 While the phrases alluded to by Circuit Judge Lourie are provided for
by the enablement clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the rules clearly state such a
discussion is part of the Brief Description, and the Detailed Description of the
Invention parts of the application.244
In addition, no one could use such a phrase in a claim as described by Circuit
Judge Lourie because the application would not pass examination. The patent rules
expressly prescribe that the preamble use language such as “I claim,” or “we
claim,” followed by “consisting of,” “comprising of,” or another comporting
phrase.245 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the patent
rules are procedural in nature, and are not substantive for barring a patent for
procedural non-compliance.246 While Circuit Judge Lourie is correct in saying that
no one uses these phrases, the enablement clause is irrelevant to his argument.247
d. Inconsistencies
Circuit Judge Lourie next seeks to justify the Court’s denial on re-hearing on
grounds that the facts here are different from other cases.248 The argument fails as
the facts here are just as sufficiently different to not justify the Court’s decision. If
anything, applying the possession test to a case involving software is a case of first
impression that requires an en banc review.
e. Passing the Opportunity
Circuit Judge Lourie next seemingly bypassed the opportunity to address the
fundamental issues of the LizardTech (2005) opinion.249 Circuit Judge Lourie first
states that the claims “must be interpreted, in light of the written description, but
not beyond it, because otherwise they would be interpreted to cover inventions or
aspects of an invention that have not been disclosed.”250 Though sounding as an
anti-omnibus claim argument, the test is whether the “written description . . .
reasonably convey[s] to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had
possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing.”251 This is the same
rule cited by the LizardTech (2005) court.252 The error by the LizardTech (2005)
court and Circuit Judge Lourie is that “the [court] never truly discussed the
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35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring) (the patent rules, specifically 37 C.F.R.
§1.77(b) (2006), prescribe the order of the descriptive sections in a patent application).
245
Form of Claims, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (8th ed. rev 6 2007). See
also 37 C.F.R. §1.75(e) (2006).
246
Fressola v. Manbeck,1995 WL 656874 (D.D.C. March 30, 1995) (upholding the one-sentence
rule of Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (5th ed. 1989)).
247
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Bilstad, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125 (holding that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences erred
in requiring a patent application for an electronic sterilization apparatus to describe every embodiment
within the range construction and not recognizing that a person skilled in the art would readily discern
that other members of the genus would perform similarly to the disclosed members).
252
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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understandings of persons skilled in the art.”253 The court should have at least
remanded for a re-hearing to ascertain the skill in the art instead of repeatedly
pointing to the specification.254
This case and the other cited cases here also raise the appropriateness of the
possession test to the fields of software and the technology-related electronic arts.
255
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has generally applied the
possession test only to the fields of material science, chemistry and the biological
arts.256 It is therefore odd that Circuit Judge Lourie alludes that the possession test
is inapplicable here while expressly averting a discussion on the possession test on
grounds “that [it] is a more complex topic having its own subtleties.”257
This disclaimer creates a problem of precedent. The first cases of the
possession test involved patents invoking earlier filed documents or reference
material, or were matters such as genus-species claims.258 The LizardTech patent
does not rely on earlier filed documents or reference material and the image
compression algorithm does not involve a genus-species claim.259 Nor is this
patent the type of subject matter the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
said applies the possession test.260 Yet, the LizardTech (2005) court clearly stated
it was relying on the possession test, providing additional grounds for a rehearing.261 By denying a rehearing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
doing just what Circuit Judge Lourie stated the court was not doing in Enzo
Biochem, i.e., “elevat[ing] possession [as] a statutory test of patentability,” or in
other words, “lowering the bar” for using the possession test.262
f. Elucidated Embodiment Test
Circuit Judge Lourie next says that “[c]laims are not necessarily limited to
preferred embodiments.”263 In this, Circuit Judge Lourie is correct. In Scimed, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit said that a patentee may rely on, and does
not have to disclose, the knowledge of a person having skill in the art for
interpretation of the embodiments.264 In addition, the doctrine of equivalence
allows a patentee to extend the scope of the embodiments to equivalents known in
the art that perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way
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Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1125.
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46.
255
Application of Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
256
See supra, Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4.
257
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
258
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 973 (restricting "the "possession" test for circumstances … in which
the inventors showed possession of a species of the invention by reference to a deposit, but may not
have described what else within the scope of the claims they had possession of.") (Lourie, J.,
concurring).
259
. See Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4.
260
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005), see also Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 969.
261
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46.
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Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 973 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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Id. at 1345.
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to obtain substantially the same result as the claimed device or process.265 In
Capon, the court stated, “[t]he “written description” requirement must be applied
in the context of the particular invention and the state of the knowledge” in the
art.266 The LizardTech (2005) court should have looked at both the specification
and the state of the knowledge in the art.
The LizardTech (2005) court had held that, “[t]here is no evidence that the
specification contemplates a more generic way of creating a seamless
[process].”267 Circuit Judge Lourie (2006) attempted to validate this decision by
saying that “merely calling an embodiment ‘preferred,’ when there are no others,
does not entitle one to claims broader than the disclosure.”268 However, neither the
LizardTech (2005) court nor Circuit Judge Lourie show that the required
knowledge for making a seamless process without use of “maintaining updated
sums,” and “periodically compressing said sums” was not within the knowledge of
a person having skill in the art.”269 The court is not allowing the patentee to act as
his own lexicographer and draft the application to the scale of complexity in the
art.270
The requirement the court should have been looking for is whether “the
specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular
feature.”271 As noted above, this is possible only by ascertaining the knowledge of
the art. The difficulty here, as with Bilstad, is that the court did not make clear that
the “feature is . . . outside the reach of the claims.”272
g. No New Matter
Circuit Judge Lourie also attempted to bolster the court’s reliance on the
possession test by pointing out that patent law bars new information in a filed
application, so 35 U.S.C. § 112 cannot have such a role.273 The law cited by
Circuit Judge Lourie states that “[n]o amendment” shall introduce new matter.”274
Here, however, Circuit Judge Lourie’s appears to add further to the confusion over
the role of the possession test. For example, in Enzo Biochem, Circuit Judge Lourie
correctly noted that an amendment cannot add knowledge to the specification, so
the possession test under § 112(1) is proper to assure that all embodiments are fully
and properly disclosed as of the filing of the application.275 Priority disputes also
involve the test of disclosure to the filing date, and would be another instance
265

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950).
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
267
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344.
268
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
269
Id. at 1343.
270
Id. at 1345 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
271
Scimed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
272
Id.
273
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375.
274
35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
275
Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J, concurring) ("[T]he proper basis
for rejection of a claim amended to recite elements thought to be without support in the original
disclosure . . . is § 112, first paragraph, not § 132.") (citing In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214-15,
211 USPQ 323, 326 (C.C.P.A.1981)).
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where Circuit Judge Lourie’s reliance on the possession test would be proper.276
However, LizardTech was about claim construction and neither an amendment nor
a priority date was before the court in this case.277 Consequently, Circuit Judge
Lourie’s invocation of §132 here is inapposite.
h. A Non-Action is Not Precedent
Circuit Judge Lourie also argued that “this court has at least twice declined
to hear a written description case en banc,” so “there is no reason for our court to
hear this case en banc.”278 The purpose of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is to “strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation.”279 Markman made claim
construction a matter of law for the court, while the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circcuit has renounced stare decisis for claim construction.280 If the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit bars stare decisis for the fundamental action of
claim construction, it is inapposite to use stare decisis as justification for inaction
on claim construction.
IV. RISE OF THE EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE
A. Circuit Judge Rader Dissents
1.

Circuit Judge Rader’s View on the JVW Opinion

At issue with Circuit Judge Rader in JVW, as argued in the LizardTech
dissent, is how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handled the disparity
between the specification and the disputed claim as compared to other holdings.281
In JVW, the court found infringement by the V3, a video game controller, even
though the patent specification for the infringed invention was a holder for a video
game controller.282
Circuit Judge Rader was not troubled that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit allowed this broad scope of patent coverage.283 In fact, Circuit
Judge Rader cited several cases (discussed infra) allowing broad interpretation of
claims.284 What Circuit Judge Rader found troubling with the JVW opinion was
that the following day another panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
issued the LizardTech ruling that invalidated, rather than finding infringement of, a
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280
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Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375-76 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20 (1981)).
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; Medrad, 401 F.3d at 1319.
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335.
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377.
Id. at 1377 (citations omitted).
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claim that the LizardTech patentee sought to have read broadly.285
2.

Comparing the Opinions

The force of Circuit Judge Rader’s dissent is immediately apparent.286 “This
court’s written description jurisprudence has become opaque to the point of
obscuring other areas of this court’s law.”287 As was apparent to Circuit Judge
Rader, the JVW court validated a claim for a video game controller holder to
include within its scope a video game controller, even though the disclosure did
not demonstrate such scope. Conversely, the LizardTech (2005) court invalidated a
claim because the disclosure did not demonstrate such broad scope.288
In both cases, the claims encompass more than the specification expressly
describes.” Yet, “[d]espite their similarities, the outcomes in LizardTech and JVW
are strikingly different.” “In JVW, this court says that a claim scope in excess of the
specification’s embodiments grants a broader range of infringement,” while “[i]n
LizardTech, this court says that a claim scope in excess of the specification’s
289
embodiments invalidates the claim.

Quoting a trade article, Circuit Judge Rader remarks that these are “[t]wo
cases whose juxtaposition presents a puzzle.”290 Circuit Judge Rader found
particularly exasperating the rationale of the courts in each case: “[I]n JVW, this
court determines that the claims are properly construed as broader than the
disclosed embodiments because ‘the patentee did not intend for the claims and the
embodiments disclosed in the specification to be coextensive.’”291 Meanwhile,
“[i]n LizardTech, this court invalidates claims that are broader than the disclosed
embodiments because ‘[t]here is no evidence that the specification contemplates a
more generic way’ of performing the claimed invention.”292
Circuit Judge Rader correctly noted that this inconsistency is not lost as a
source of confusion for the patent bar. “[T]hese next-door neighbors in West’s
Federal Reporter must leave practitioners in a quandary.”293 Acknowledging the
true difficulty, Circuit Judge Rader said that in the face of these opinions, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “provides little or no guidance about the
standard it uses to decide” whether a disclosure is adequate under 35 U.S.C. §
112.294
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LizardTech, 242 F.3d at 1346.
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376-81 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1347.
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting John L. Rogitz, CAFC Happenings, Intell. Prop. Today, November, 2005, at 32).
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335).
Id. (citing LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344).
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Id. at 1380.
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B. The Crooked Path to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine
At this point, the reader might want to step back and look at the claim
construction routes taken by both cases. The claim construction in JVW was “in
light of this court’s recent en banc clarification of claim construction [in
Phillips].”295 LizardTech, on the other hand, was faced with “constru[ing] claim 21
as limited to seamless discrete wavelet transformation . . . despite the absence of
the term seamless in that claim,”296 and without “maintaining updated sums,” or
“periodically compressing said sums” in the process.297
It is also helpful to recognize that in JVW, the accused infringer asked that
the court read the claim narrowly according to the specification where the patent
did not express the disputed scope of claim.298 Instead, the court declined and held
for infringement.299 According to Circuit Judge Rader, this is keeping with the
Phillips viewpoint. “Phillips clarified claim construction, and in the process
discussed the situation of specific embodiments coupled with broad claims:
“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the
invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
embodiments.”300
Circuit Judge Rader also cited other case law supporting a broader reading of
the claim:
[C]laims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific
301
embodiments in the specification.’
In particular, we have expressly rejected the
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the
302
To avoid
patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.
importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is important to keep
in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill
303
in the art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.
Indeed, in Phillips itself, this court gave the broad claim term ‘baffle’ a meaning
304
beyond the narrower bullet-deflecting embodiments in the specification.

In LizardTech, on the other hand, the court adopted a disputed claim
construction at the argument of the patentee.305 Then, the patentee suggested that

295
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335)
(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (en banc)).
296
Id. at 1376-77 n.1.
297
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343.
298
JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335.
299
Id. at 1336.
300
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1326-27).
301
Id. (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906-08 (Fed. Cir. 2004); citing
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and SRI Int'l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
302
Id (citing Gemstar-TV Guide v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
303
Id. See also Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
304
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377) (Rader, J. dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1326-27 (en
banc)).
305
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344.
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the court should read the claim broadly with less regard to the specification.306
Instead, the court held the claim invalid.307 Thus, the outcome seems dependent on
who does the asking. As bizarre as this observation seems to be, Circuit Judge
Rader recognized an “unsatisfying solution” of logic to the cases.308 This is the
“evolving written description doctrine.”309
If the claims are construed as confined to the embodiments in the specification,
written description invalidity does not come into play. If the claims, on the other
hand, are construed to embrace more than the specification, this court (on only
some occasions and without a clear standard to determine those occasions in
310
advance) will invalidate.

As Circuit Judge Rader commented, the LizardTech ruling must leave
“[p]atent owners and practitioners. . . [struggling] to resolve the tension between
Phillips and cases like LizardTech.”311 Certainly, the patentee must have been
shocked at the claim invalidation.312 On the other hand, although the phrase
“evolving written description doctrine” is rather new, this author is of the opinion
that the doctrine has been in place for some time.
C. The Link to Possession
In many patent litigation cases, we can assume the accused infringer will
want the patent construed within the specification tightened, or invalidated, while
the patentee is looking for the broadest scope of claim coverage. Thus, the first
sentence of Circuit Judge Rader’s evolving written description doctrine applies to
the accused infringer while the second phrase applies to the patentee.313 At the
outset then, Circuit Judge Rader’s evolving written description doctrine seems to
be a statement in which the outcome seems somewhat dependent on who does the
asking.314
The next question is that if this is truly a doctrine, what precedents define
how the doctrine works? In discussing the dissent initially, Circuit Judge Rader did
not mention the possession test by name, but there was no mistaking he was saying
that neither patent qualified for such exacting treatment: “[B]oth LizardTech and
JVW confront an issue common to many patent disputes: claims that are broader
than the disclosed embodiments. (citations omitted.) Neither opinion involves
biotechnology or chemistry, . . .[nor] discusses the issue of complexity or
uncertainty in the art, a frequent characteristic of claims invalidated on written
306

Id. at 1346.
Id.
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LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376.
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Id. at 1379.
310
Id. at 1377 n.1.
311
Id. at 1378.
312
Id. at 1377 n.1.
313
LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377 n. 1.
314
The accused infringer would want the invention "confined to the embodiments in the
specification," while the patentee would want "the claims … construed to embrace more than the
specification." Id.
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description grounds.”315
As noted above, Circuit Judge Lourie also bypassed an invocation of the
term “possession.” even though the LizardTech (2005) court expressly invoked the
term.316 With both Circuit Judge Lourie and Circuit Judge Rader talking around
“possession,” it sounds like some kind of judicial mysticism—or an elephant in the
courtroom.
D. An Evolving Mystical Expression
In 1991, Vas-Cath described the possession test and enablement as separate
requirements.317 Sometime thereafter, confusion set in, even in the same case. In
Enzo Biochem, the court struggled with defining the possession test by saying that
“[e]nabling one of skill in the art to make and use the invention is a separate
requirement.”318 One example the court provided was that “[a] description of [the
invention] . . . in terms of . . . function . . . fails to distinguish [the invention] from
others having the same activity or function.”319 This seems fairly clear until we see
that in the same opinion, the court said that “possession . . . is only a criterion for
satisfying the statutory written description requirement[, it] is not necessarily
equivalent to providing a written description.”320 Adding further to the confusion
was the LizardTech (2005) court, which said that the written description “[1] must
describe the manner and process of making and using the invention so as to enable
a person of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the invention without
undue experimentation [,and, (2)] describe the invention sufficiently to convey to a
person of skill in the art that the patentee had possession of the claimed invention
at the time of the application, i.e., that the patentee invented what is claimed.”321
As a two-part description, this discussion clarifies, as in Vas-Cath, that the written
description is two parts, enablement (under the PHOSITA test), and possession (a
full description of the invention at the time of filing).322
Instead of continuing this distinction, the LizardTech (2005) court then tied
enablement and possession together and made them interchangeable.323 “[A]
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim
is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of
the invention, and vice versa.”324
As Circuit Judge Rader recognized, the LizardTech (2005) court had reverted
back to the Enzo Biochem confusion by not “providing [a] neutral standard of
application, [other than saying] . . . the specification must show ‘possession’ of the
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Id. at 1376.
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345.
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563.
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 972 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 968 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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claimed invention.”325 In doing so, the LizardTech court had once again tossed the
enablement requirement and the possession test together without regard as to
which they were applying.326 This lack of distinction is problematic in that rather
than “explaining a neutral standard for applying written description, LizardTech
seems to fall back on enablement, using the latter as a proxy for the former.”327
The opinion of this author is that by focusing on the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
confused the written description requirement with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. §
112, paragraph 2 for claims that particularly point out and distinctly disclose the
elements of the invention. Circuit Judge Rader well summarized this confusion.
“LizardTech’s two clear statements of written description law, [the written
description must establish] that the patentee invented what is claimed, and, an
originally filed claim can provide the requisite written description, are relegated to
bookends surrounding an enablement-based application of the new written
description doctrine.”328 As Circuit Judge Rader noted above, the focus in
LizardTech is on the claim in the specification (claim 21 specifically). Yet, the
word “claim” does not appear in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In focusing
on the possession of enablement in the written description, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has overlooked the second paragraph of § 112 which
requires a “specification [that] particularly point[s] out and distinctly claim[s] the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Consequently, the
difficulty the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has with possession does not
lie with the enablement requirement of §112(1), but with the definiteness
requirement of §112(2). As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Evans, the purpose of
the specification of a patent is “to put the public in possession of what the party
claims as his own invention.”329 In focusing on enablement, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has misplaced the focus from “[t]he name of the game is the
claim.”330
E. Mystical Precedent
While bringing focus on the possession test, LizardTech (2006) did not
answer any questions helpful to resolve the written description dichotomy of
enablement and possession.331 One question might be the origin, but this author
suspects the court would disagree even about that. Circuit Judge Rader cited Enzo
Biochem (2002) as point of origin for the “court[‘s] search[] for a proper standard
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for its revised and evolving written description doctrine.”332 In Enzo Biochem, the
Court of Appeals “scuttled the “bright line” Lilly (1997) test for written description
invalidity.”333 This author, however, traces the written description muddle to at
least Vas-Cath (1991) which, in the opinion of this author, “appl[ied the]
“possession” test . . . in a way not contemplated by the original test.”334
Regardless of the starting point, the difficulty has been “the impossibility of
finding a standard that measures the sufficiency of the disclosure in a specification
by comparing two parts of that same specification.”335 This may be understandable
where, “[t]he descriptive text needed to meet [the evolving written description
requirement] . . . will vary with differences in the state of the knowledge in the field
and differences in the predictability of the science.”336 However, it is doubtful that
anyone wants a patent system that requires the patentee to “[b]ring [the]
specifications to the Federal Circuit and we will tell you if they contain sufficient
descriptions.”337
LizardTech (2006) at least showed that “it is apparent that a significant
number of Federal Circuit judges agree that this court’s evolving written
description doctrine needs clarification.”338 “My vote to deny en banc review,
however, should not be taken as an endorsement of our existing written description
jurisprudence.”339 “Perhaps the entire line of [written description] cases stemming
from Ruschig is wrong, and perhaps we should at some point address that question
en banc.”340
However, LizardTech also showed “the court is in no hurry to clarify the
issue.”341 “Future panel opinions may provide the necessary clarity.”342 “I take no
position on that issue at this juncture.”343 Thus, Circuit Judge Rader is undoubtedly
correct that “as this court’s case law creation strays farther from the statute, its
application only gets more strained.”344 While LizardTech is but one more case
that makes perpetuates the confusion, it likely will not be the last.
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CONCLUSION

A. From the Judicial Point of View: Show Possession
Through this mud of judicial doctrine, Circuit Judge Rader provided two
clear statements for practitioners and the judiciary. For practitioners, Circuit Judge
Rader gave this gem: “The ostensible standard for an adequate written description
is that the specification must show possession of the claimed invention.”345 As yet
(2007) the court has not clarified the position of the possession doctrine to the
written description. This author agrees with Circuit Judge Rader, who gave the
judiciary this admonishment: “From my perspective, this court should not
postpone further en banc reconsideration of its evolving written description
doctrine.”346
Until the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit does gives an en banc
definition, or a retreat from possession, the patent bar will suffer from the lack of a
definition of what the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considers the
requirements of possession.
B. From the Statutory Point of View: Enablement and Definiteness
While the JVW347 holding might seem inconsistent with LizardTech; the
cases presented here, and the discussion in this article show that the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals is requiring patentees to show one thing. “An applicant complies
with the written description requirement by describing the invention, with all its
claimed limitations.”348
The JVW patentee won against the Interact V3 because, as the comparative
patent drawing and Interact V3 photograph show, the V3 mirrored the patented
invention almost identically.349 On the other hand, the JVW patentee lost against
the Interact V4 because the specification did not provide a discussion of any means
for lockably receiving the video game controller other than the L-shaped clips.
Similarly, LizardTech lost claim 21 and its dependent claims because the
claim omitted a necessary element and specification failed to demonstrate how
someone could operate the patented method without “maintaining updated
sums.”350 The cases discussed here show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit requires patentees to delineate every element and every embodiment in
sufficient detail, so that of the filing date, the specification enables a person having
skill in the field of art to understand how to make the invention, how to use the
invention, and the inventor’s best mode. The problem with the possession doctrine
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is, as Circuit Judge Rader said: “Bring your specifications to the Federal Circuit
and we will tell you if they contain sufficient descriptions.”351 Both 35 U.S.C. §
112 and judicial doctrine provide for broad claim construction through means plus
function, the doctrine of equivalents and genus-species claims.352 The possession
doctrine restricts the ability of the patentee to use these statutes and doctrines.
C. From the Practitioner Point of View
The author reviewed many cases not cited here. This research leads the
author to believe that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has created a
two-headed monster for itself and the patent bar. One side wants more disclosure
of enablement and definiteness to explain new technologies for which the courts
and art are unprepared. The other side wants to keep the balance of technology and
patent innovation moving forward.
Rather than clearly state the requirement, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit once coined a buzzword named possession and is now reluctant to
back away from precedent, even though it disclaims stare decisis—the elephant in
the courtroom.
With this greater disclosure requirement in mind, this author supports Circuit
Judge Rader’s admonition that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has an
“evolving written description doctrine.”353 While patent prosecution standards
were due for tightening in the face of criticism over lax issue policies, the role of
the judiciary is interpretation of statutes. By creating the possession doctrine and
loosely applying this judicial requirement, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is expanding judicial doctrine beyond the statutory constraints of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.
Regardless of whether in the greater scheme of patent practice and litigation
the LizardTech court got it right, interpretations such as JVW will become rare if
not extinct. As Circuit Judge Rader commented, patent practitioners are in a
“quandary.”354 The possession test is not a detailed requirement, but rather is a
“requirement of detail” unlike any checklist within case law or the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure.
As a practitioner, this author agrees that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit must abide by precedent and fully explain its rationale. The void of
explanation creates unnecessary effort for practitioners in drafting applications and
unnecessary expenses. Compounding matters is that a longer application is not
necessarily more definitive. District courts will struggle with longer applications,
and increasing reversal rates.
The judiciary will likely take a decade to resolve this newest doctrine. Patent
practitioners need answers now for present and future claim construction issues to
secure the widest permissible patent rights without invalidation or litigation
351
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negating the purpose of the patent. While technology, biology and even language
evolve, interpretation of the written description, concluding with the claims, must
be sufficiently unchanging such that it does not frustrate the constitutional mandate
that intellectual property serves which is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.”355
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